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      <title>CVE-2026-42080 — PPTAgent: Arbitrary File Write via `save_generated_slides`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; icip-cas PPTAgent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PPTAgent is an agentic framework for reflective PowerPoint generation. Prior to commit 418491a, there is an arbitrary file write vulnerability via `save_generated_slides`. This issue has been patched via commit 418491a.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; icip-cas PPTAgent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PPTAgent is an agentic framework for reflective PowerPoint generation. Prior to commit 418491a, there is an arbitrary file write vulnerability via `save_generated_slides`. This issue has been patched via commit 418491a.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42080</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2894 — PPTAgent: Arbitrary File Write via `save_generated_slides`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2894</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pptagent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `save_generated_slides` MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300
async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str):
    &amp;#34;&amp;#34;&amp;#34;Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Args:
        pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file
    &amp;#34;&amp;#34;&amp;#34;
    pptx = Path(pptx_path)
    assert len(self.slides), (
        &amp;#34;No slides generated, please call `generate_slide` first&amp;#34;
    )
    pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # ← creates arbitrary directories
    self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)                    # ← writes to arbitrary path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The call to `pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates any intermediate directories, and `self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)` writes a valid PPTX binary (ZIP archive) to the specified path. No is_relative_to(workspace) check is performed — contrast with download_file in deeppresenter/tools/search.py:290, which correctly enforces workspace confinement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The server changes directory to WORKSPACE (if set) on startup, so relative paths land in the workspace. Absolute paths, however, reach any filesystem location accessible to the server process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The concrete attack scenarios include&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Cron persistence (root-running server): `pptx_path =…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pptagent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `save_generated_slides` MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300
async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str):
    &amp;#34;&amp;#34;&amp;#34;Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Args:
        pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file
    &amp;#34;&amp;#34;&amp;#34;
    pptx = Path(pptx_path)
    assert len(self.slides), (
        &amp;#34;No slides generated, please call `generate_slide` first&amp;#34;
    )
    pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # ← creates arbitrary directories
    self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)                    # ← writes to arbitrary path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The call to `pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates any intermediate directories, and `self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)` writes a valid PPTX binary (ZIP archive) to the specified path. No is_relative_to(workspace) check is performed — contrast with download_file in deeppresenter/tools/search.py:290, which correctly enforces workspace confinement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The server changes directory to WORKSPACE (if set) on startup, so relative paths land in the workspace. Absolute paths, however, reach any filesystem location accessible to the server process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The concrete attack scenarios include&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Cron persistence (root-running server): `pptx_path =…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2894</guid>
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