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      <title>CVE-2026-54478 — DNS Cookie bypass when combined with proxy-protocol use</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54478</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLnet Labs Unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.18.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound listens on a &amp;#39;proxy-protocol-port&amp;#39; interface with &amp;#39;answer-cookie: yes&amp;#39;, the RFC 9018 server-cookie SipHash is computed over the proxy&amp;#39;s wire address instead of the PROXYv2-declared client. One server cookie obtained through a given proxy node therefore validates for every PROXYv2-declared source behind that node. On a UDP+proxy-protocol front, an off-path attacker can harvest one cookie with a single legitimate query, then replay it under any spoofed source and pass DNS Cookie checks that were deployed to defeat this in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLnet Labs Unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.18.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound listens on a &amp;#39;proxy-protocol-port&amp;#39; interface with &amp;#39;answer-cookie: yes&amp;#39;, the RFC 9018 server-cookie SipHash is computed over the proxy&amp;#39;s wire address instead of the PROXYv2-declared client. One server cookie obtained through a given proxy node therefore validates for every PROXYv2-declared source behind that node. On a UDP+proxy-protocol front, an off-path attacker can harvest one cookie with a single legitimate query, then replay it under any spoofed source and pass DNS Cookie checks that were deployed to defeat this in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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