<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 05:21:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2023-46841 — x86: shadow stack vs exceptions from emulation stubs</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-46841</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Xen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET).  A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).
CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented
Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data
and return addresses are accompanied by so called &amp;#34;shadow stacks&amp;#34;,
holding little more than return addresses.  Shadow stacks aren&amp;#39;t
writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their
contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address
coming from the traditional stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen.  In
various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of
the instruction.  Such replaying typically involves filling and then
invoking of a stub.  Such a replayed instruction may raise an
exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&amp;#39;t right:
Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.
The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Xen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET).  A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).
CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented
Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data
and return addresses are accompanied by so called &amp;#34;shadow stacks&amp;#34;,
holding little more than return addresses.  Shadow stacks aren&amp;#39;t
writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their
contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address
coming from the traditional stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen.  In
various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of
the instruction.  Such replaying typically involves filling and then
invoking of a stub.  Such a replayed instruction may raise an
exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&amp;#39;t right:
Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.
The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-46841</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
