https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:56:10 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-49855 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>Tornado&#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.</p> <p>This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.</p> <p>Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>Tornado&#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.</p> <p>This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.</p> <p>Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-49855 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-hp19968 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: airflow-3</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the airflow-3 package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: airflow-3</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the airflow-3 package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-hp19968 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49855 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> tornadoweb tornado</p> <p>Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.6, Tornado gzip decompression routines processed limited-size chunks but did not enforce an overall limit on accumulated decompressed chunks, allowing a malicious server accessed by SimpleAsyncHTTPClient or an HTTPServer configured with decompress_request=True to consume effectively unlimited memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.6.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> tornadoweb tornado</p> <p>Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.6, Tornado gzip decompression routines processed limited-size chunks but did not enforce an overall limit on accumulated decompressed chunks, allowing a malicious server accessed by SimpleAsyncHTTPClient or an HTTPServer configured with decompress_request=True to consume effectively unlimited memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.6.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49855 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3389 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: tornado</p> <p>Tornado&#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.</p> <p>This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.</p> <p>Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: tornado</p> <p>Tornado&#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.</p> <p>This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.</p> <p>Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3389