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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf — OpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-j26j-7qc4-3mrf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
An attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Technical Details
- Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only.
- The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsentUrl(...)` and pending-upload removal.
- Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24`
- Vulnerable range: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.24`
- Patched in release: `2026.2.25`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remediation
Upgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.25` (or later) once published.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
An attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Technical Details
- Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only.
- The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsentUrl(...)` and pending-upload removal.
- Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24`
- Vulnerable range: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.24`
- Patched in release: `2026.2.25`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remediation
Upgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.25` (or later) once published.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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