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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:52:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-95690 — Excessive Memory Allocation in DTLS Handshake Message Reassembly</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-95690</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenSSL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issue summary: Receiving crafted out-of-sequence DTLS handshake fragments may
cause OpenSSL to allocate a full message-length reassembly buffer for each
buffered message, so a small amount of wire data consumes a large amount of
memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact summary: A remote attacker can send a few small crafted DTLS handshake
fragments to make a DTLS server or client allocate well over a megabyte of
memory per connection, which may lead to memory exhaustion and Denial of
Service if many connections are made.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description: DTLS handshake messages can arrive out of order and fragmented,
so OpenSSL buffers fragments of up to ten out-of-sequence messages until
reassembly is possible. When the first fragment of a new message arrives,
OpenSSL allocates a buffer sized to the full message length declared in the
fragment header, plus a reassembly bitmap, instead of storing only the bytes
actually received. The declared length is capped by the maximum certificate
list size, 128KB by default, and that cap applies to every handshake message
type rather than only to Certificate messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only DTLS endpoints reach this code. TLS, QUIC and applications that do not
use DTLS are unaffected. An attacker sends fragments that declare a large
message length but carry almost no data, using up to ten distinct message
sequence numbers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A single connection can then hold roughly 1.4MB of buffers from about 156
bytes on the wire. Because the nu…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenSSL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issue summary: Receiving crafted out-of-sequence DTLS handshake fragments may
cause OpenSSL to allocate a full message-length reassembly buffer for each
buffered message, so a small amount of wire data consumes a large amount of
memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact summary: A remote attacker can send a few small crafted DTLS handshake
fragments to make a DTLS server or client allocate well over a megabyte of
memory per connection, which may lead to memory exhaustion and Denial of
Service if many connections are made.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description: DTLS handshake messages can arrive out of order and fragmented,
so OpenSSL buffers fragments of up to ten out-of-sequence messages until
reassembly is possible. When the first fragment of a new message arrives,
OpenSSL allocates a buffer sized to the full message length declared in the
fragment header, plus a reassembly bitmap, instead of storing only the bytes
actually received. The declared length is capped by the maximum certificate
list size, 128KB by default, and that cap applies to every handshake message
type rather than only to Certificate messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only DTLS endpoints reach this code. TLS, QUIC and applications that do not
use DTLS are unaffected. An attacker sends fragments that declare a large
message length but carry almost no data, using up to ten distinct message
sequence numbers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A single connection can then hold roughly 1.4MB of buffers from about 156
bytes on the wire. Because the nu…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-95690</guid>
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