https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 18:06:57 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45137 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> solana-foundation anchor</p> <p>Anchor is a framework providing several convenient developer tools for writing Solana programs. From 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2, an logic error causes anchor programs to accept any program id when requiring the system program id, causing false assumptions resulting in potential arbitrary cpi in programs that invoke system program instructions. In the TryFrom&lt;&amp;&#39;a AccountInfo&lt;&#39;a&gt;&gt; implementation for Program&lt;&#39;a, T&gt;, the id of T is compared with Pubkey::default() to check whether anchor should allow any executable account, or a specific account, because when no T is supplied, T defaults to (), which implements Id::id() by returning Pubkey::default(). This results in T = () and T = System (which has Pubkey::default() as the id) having the same behavior, both allow any executable account. Programs built with anchor assume that the anchor runtime verifies passed in programs of type Program&lt;&#39;a, System&gt; are in fact the system program. This false assumption can lead to arbitrary CPI or payment bypassing when programs try making CPI calls to the system program using the passed in system program due to the fact that the attacker can pass in any program instead of the system program. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.2.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> solana-foundation anchor</p> <p>Anchor is a framework providing several convenient developer tools for writing Solana programs. From 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2, an logic error causes anchor programs to accept any program id when requiring the system program id, causing false assumptions resulting in potential arbitrary cpi in programs that invoke system program instructions. In the TryFrom&lt;&amp;&#39;a AccountInfo&lt;&#39;a&gt;&gt; implementation for Program&lt;&#39;a, T&gt;, the id of T is compared with Pubkey::default() to check whether anchor should allow any executable account, or a specific account, because when no T is supplied, T defaults to (), which implements Id::id() by returning Pubkey::default(). This results in T = () and T = System (which has Pubkey::default() as the id) having the same behavior, both allow any executable account. Programs built with anchor assume that the anchor runtime verifies passed in programs of type Program&lt;&#39;a, System&gt; are in fact the system program. This false assumption can lead to arbitrary CPI or payment bypassing when programs try making CPI calls to the system program using the passed in system program due to the fact that the attacker can pass in any program instead of the system program. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45137 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0144 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: anchor-lang</p> <p>Affected versions of `anchor-lang` did not properly validate accounts declared as `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;`. The generic `Program&lt;T&gt;` validation path used `Pubkey::default()` as a sentinel to decide whether any executable program should be accepted. Since the system program id is also the default pubkey, `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;` was treated like the untyped `Program&lt;&#39;info&gt;` case and accepted any executable program account.</p> <p>Programs commonly rely on `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;` to ensure that CPI calls and instruction builders target the real Solana system program. With the faulty validation, an attacker could supply another executable program where the system program was expected, causing downstream logic to make false assumptions about payments, account creation, or other system-program CPIs.</p> <p>The issue was fixed in `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 by separating the typed `Program&lt;T&gt;` validation path from the untyped `Program&lt;()&gt;` path, so `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;` now checks the provided account key against the system program id. Users should upgrade to `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 or later.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: anchor-lang</p> <p>Affected versions of `anchor-lang` did not properly validate accounts declared as `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;`. The generic `Program&lt;T&gt;` validation path used `Pubkey::default()` as a sentinel to decide whether any executable program should be accepted. Since the system program id is also the default pubkey, `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;` was treated like the untyped `Program&lt;&#39;info&gt;` case and accepted any executable program account.</p> <p>Programs commonly rely on `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;` to ensure that CPI calls and instruction builders target the real Solana system program. With the faulty validation, an attacker could supply another executable program where the system program was expected, causing downstream logic to make false assumptions about payments, account creation, or other system-program CPIs.</p> <p>The issue was fixed in `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 by separating the typed `Program&lt;T&gt;` validation path from the untyped `Program&lt;()&gt;` path, so `Program&lt;&#39;info, System&gt;` now checks the provided account key against the system program id. Users should upgrade to `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 or later.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0144