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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-67309 — Traefik v3.7.0 Path Traversal via RewriteTarget Authentication Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-67309</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; traefik&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Traefik versions &amp;gt;= v3.7.0 and &amp;lt;= v3.7.7 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider&amp;#39;s RewriteTarget middleware (generated from the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target annotation). When an Ingress path uses a regex that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (e.g., path /api(.*) with rewrite target /$1), a crafted request such as /api../admin matches the public router, is rewritten to a dot-segment traversal path (/../admin), and is forwarded without post-replacement normalization validation. A backend that normalizes dot segments resolves the path to a protected endpoint (e.g., /admin) reachable only through a separate router secured with BasicAuth, DigestAuth, or ForwardAuth, resulting in route-level authentication bypass. The issue is fixed in v3.7.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; traefik&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Traefik versions &amp;gt;= v3.7.0 and &amp;lt;= v3.7.7 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider&amp;#39;s RewriteTarget middleware (generated from the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target annotation). When an Ingress path uses a regex that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (e.g., path /api(.*) with rewrite target /$1), a crafted request such as /api../admin matches the public router, is rewritten to a dot-segment traversal path (/../admin), and is forwarded without post-replacement normalization validation. A backend that normalizes dot segments resolves the path to a protected endpoint (e.g., /admin) reachable only through a separate router secured with BasicAuth, DigestAuth, or ForwardAuth, resulting in route-level authentication bypass. The issue is fixed in v3.7.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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