https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 22 Oct 2026 13:06:30 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2481 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: flyto-core</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`flyto-core`&#39;s SSRF protection (`validate_url_ssrf` / `is_private_ip` in `src/core/utils.py`) blocks private and metadata destinations by resolving the host and testing the resulting IP for membership in a hardcoded `PRIVATE_IP_RANGES` list. That list contains only the *native* RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local / unique-local ranges. It does **not** account for IPv6 transition address forms that embed an IPv4 (or loopback) target:</p> <p>- IPv4-mapped `::ffff:a.b.c.d` - IPv4-compatible `::a.b.c.d` - 6to4 `2002::/16` - NAT64 well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96` and local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`</p> <p>A workflow author can submit a URL with a literal transition-form host (for example `http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/...` or `http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/`). `is_private_ip()` returns `False` for these (the address is not literally inside any listed range), so `validate_url_ssrf` lets the request through, and the `http.get` atomic module (and ~10 sibling modules that share the same guard) performs the outbound `aiohttp` fetch and returns the response body. On a host that uses NAT64/6to4 these addresses route to the embedded IPv4 endpoint (e.g. the cloud instance-metadata service `169.254.169.254`); on any dual-stack host the IPv4-mapped form is routed by the kernel directly to the embedded IPv4, including loopback and RFC 1918 internal services.</p> <p>This is CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery): the guard that exists specifically to keep workflow-authored URLs away from int…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: flyto-core</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`flyto-core`&#39;s SSRF protection (`validate_url_ssrf` / `is_private_ip` in `src/core/utils.py`) blocks private and metadata destinations by resolving the host and testing the resulting IP for membership in a hardcoded `PRIVATE_IP_RANGES` list. That list contains only the *native* RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local / unique-local ranges. It does **not** account for IPv6 transition address forms that embed an IPv4 (or loopback) target:</p> <p>- IPv4-mapped `::ffff:a.b.c.d` - IPv4-compatible `::a.b.c.d` - 6to4 `2002::/16` - NAT64 well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96` and local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`</p> <p>A workflow author can submit a URL with a literal transition-form host (for example `http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/...` or `http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/`). `is_private_ip()` returns `False` for these (the address is not literally inside any listed range), so `validate_url_ssrf` lets the request through, and the `http.get` atomic module (and ~10 sibling modules that share the same guard) performs the outbound `aiohttp` fetch and returns the response body. On a host that uses NAT64/6to4 these addresses route to the embedded IPv4 endpoint (e.g. the cloud instance-metadata service `169.254.169.254`); on any dual-stack host the IPv4-mapped form is routed by the kernel directly to the embedded IPv4, including loopback and RFC 1918 internal services.</p> <p>This is CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery): the guard that exists specifically to keep workflow-authored URLs away from int…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2481