https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 20 Oct 2026 20:09:29 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45299 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.0, the profile_image_url field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary data: URI values without MIME-type validation, resulting in a XSS vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.0, the profile_image_url field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary data: URI values without MIME-type validation, resulting in a XSS vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45299 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2708 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `profile_image_url` field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary `data:` URI values without MIME-type validation. Two distinct attack paths were independently demonstrated by separate reporters:</p> <p>1. **`data:text/html;base64,...` in a new browser tab** (raresvis, 2025-04-17) — when a victim right-clicks a user&#39;s profile picture and chooses &#34;Open image in new tab&#34;, the browser navigates to the data: URL and executes embedded scripts in the `data:` origin. Limited to social-engineering / redirect attacks because the script does not run in the application origin.</p> <p>2. **`data:image/svg+xml;base64,...` re-served by the application origin** (Gh05t666nero, 2026-01-09) — `GET /api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile/image` decoded the base64 and returned `StreamingResponse(media_type=&lt;user-controlled&gt;)` extracted from the `data:` header. With `media_type=image/svg+xml` and `Content-Disposition: inline`, the SVG-embedded scripts executed in the **application origin**, enabling JWT theft from `localStorage` and full account takeover of any user — including admins — who loaded the malicious profile image URL.</p> <p>Both attack paths share the same root cause (lack of MIME-type validation on `profile_image_url`) and are closed by the same fix.</p> <p>## Vulnerable code (v0.7.0)</p> <p>`backend/open_webui/routers/users.py` `get_user_profile_image_by_id()`:</p> <p>```python elif user.profile_image_url.startswith(&#34;data:image&#34;): header, base64_data = user.profile_image_url.split(&#34;,&#34;, 1)…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `profile_image_url` field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary `data:` URI values without MIME-type validation. Two distinct attack paths were independently demonstrated by separate reporters:</p> <p>1. **`data:text/html;base64,...` in a new browser tab** (raresvis, 2025-04-17) — when a victim right-clicks a user&#39;s profile picture and chooses &#34;Open image in new tab&#34;, the browser navigates to the data: URL and executes embedded scripts in the `data:` origin. Limited to social-engineering / redirect attacks because the script does not run in the application origin.</p> <p>2. **`data:image/svg+xml;base64,...` re-served by the application origin** (Gh05t666nero, 2026-01-09) — `GET /api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile/image` decoded the base64 and returned `StreamingResponse(media_type=&lt;user-controlled&gt;)` extracted from the `data:` header. With `media_type=image/svg+xml` and `Content-Disposition: inline`, the SVG-embedded scripts executed in the **application origin**, enabling JWT theft from `localStorage` and full account takeover of any user — including admins — who loaded the malicious profile image URL.</p> <p>Both attack paths share the same root cause (lack of MIME-type validation on `profile_image_url`) and are closed by the same fix.</p> <p>## Vulnerable code (v0.7.0)</p> <p>`backend/open_webui/routers/users.py` `get_user_profile_image_by_id()`:</p> <p>```python elif user.profile_image_url.startswith(&#34;data:image&#34;): header, base64_data = user.profile_image_url.split(&#34;,&#34;, 1)…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2708