https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 08:21:26 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-5h2c-8v84-qpvr <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>### Summary OpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup environment values and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell startup paths before loading env keys.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `&gt;= 2026.1.5` and `&lt;= 2026.2.21-2` - Fixed on `main`: `9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7` - Planned patched release version (pre-set): `2026.2.22`</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable chain was in the shell-env fallback path:</p> <p>1. `src/infra/shell-env.ts` - `resolveShell(env)` trusted `env.SHELL` when set. - `execLoginShellEnvZero(...)` executed `${SHELL} -l -c &#34;env -0&#34;` with inherited runtime env.</p> <p>2. `src/config/io.ts` - Config env values were applied before shell fallback execution.</p> <p>3. `src/config/env-vars.ts` / env policy coverage - `SHELL` handling was hardened, but startup-path selectors (`HOME`, `ZDOTDIR`) still needed explicit blocking in config env ingestion and sanitization for shell fallback execution.</p> <p>With env/config influence, this could trigger unintended command execution in shell startup processing on the OpenClaw host process context.</p> <p>### Fix Mainline hardening now: - blocks `SHELL`, `HOME`, and `ZDOTDIR` during config env ingestion used by runtime fallback, - sanitizes shell fallback execution env, pinning `HOME` to the real user home and dropping `ZDOTDIR` + dangerous startup vars, - adds regression tests for config env ingestion and shell fallback/path-probe sanitization.</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `9363c320d8ffe292909…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>### Summary OpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup environment values and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell startup paths before loading env keys.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `&gt;= 2026.1.5` and `&lt;= 2026.2.21-2` - Fixed on `main`: `9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7` - Planned patched release version (pre-set): `2026.2.22`</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable chain was in the shell-env fallback path:</p> <p>1. `src/infra/shell-env.ts` - `resolveShell(env)` trusted `env.SHELL` when set. - `execLoginShellEnvZero(...)` executed `${SHELL} -l -c &#34;env -0&#34;` with inherited runtime env.</p> <p>2. `src/config/io.ts` - Config env values were applied before shell fallback execution.</p> <p>3. `src/config/env-vars.ts` / env policy coverage - `SHELL` handling was hardened, but startup-path selectors (`HOME`, `ZDOTDIR`) still needed explicit blocking in config env ingestion and sanitization for shell fallback execution.</p> <p>With env/config influence, this could trigger unintended command execution in shell startup processing on the OpenClaw host process context.</p> <p>### Fix Mainline hardening now: - blocks `SHELL`, `HOME`, and `ZDOTDIR` during config env ingestion used by runtime fallback, - sanitizes shell fallback execution env, pinning `HOME` to the real user home and dropping `ZDOTDIR` + dangerous startup vars, - adds regression tests for config env ingestion and shell fallback/path-probe sanitization.</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `9363c320d8ffe292909…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-5h2c-8v84-qpvr