https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 13 Oct 2026 06:27:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2020-26281 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> http-rs async-h1</p> <p>async-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients&#39; requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user&#39;s request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> http-rs async-h1</p> <p>async-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients&#39; requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user&#39;s request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2020-26281 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2020-0093 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: async-h1</p> <p>This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications.</p> <p>If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body.</p> <p>One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request.</p> <p>Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients&#39; requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user&#39;s request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary.</p> <p>The flaw was corrected in commit [7df79f](https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1/commit/7df79f1d5d99fc0f492b315eebc7f0d301a85212) by ensuring that the request body is always consumed from the tcp stream before attempting to read subsequent keep-alive request headers from it.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: async-h1</p> <p>This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications.</p> <p>If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body.</p> <p>One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request.</p> <p>Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients&#39; requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user&#39;s request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary.</p> <p>The flaw was corrected in commit [7df79f](https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1/commit/7df79f1d5d99fc0f492b315eebc7f0d301a85212) by ensuring that the request body is always consumed from the tcp stream before attempting to read subsequent keep-alive request headers from it.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2020-0093