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      <title>CVE-2026-34067 — nimiq-transaction vulnerable to panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34067</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nimiq-transaction&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq&amp;#39;s Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nimiq-transaction&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq&amp;#39;s Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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