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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:41:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-71861 — Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding header…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-71861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; chainguard-dev sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Chainguard SDK is a public Go SDK for integrating with the Chainguard platform. Prior to 0.1.107, auth/aws.VerifyToken trusts the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers without requiring those headers to be covered by AWS SigV4 SignedHeaders. An attacker with a fresh STS GetCallerIdentity request signed by a victim can rewrite the unsigned binding headers and replay the proof to another relying party, causing the relying party to authenticate the victim’s AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. Code that only uses auth/aws.GenerateToken is unaffected because the generator signs the binding headers, and exploitation requires a signed request within its validity window. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.107.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; chainguard-dev sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Chainguard SDK is a public Go SDK for integrating with the Chainguard platform. Prior to 0.1.107, auth/aws.VerifyToken trusts the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers without requiring those headers to be covered by AWS SigV4 SignedHeaders. An attacker with a fresh STS GetCallerIdentity request signed by a victim can rewrite the unsigned binding headers and replay the proof to another relying party, causing the relying party to authenticate the victim’s AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. Code that only uses auth/aws.GenerateToken is unaffected because the generator signs the binding headers, and exploitation requires a signed request within its validity window. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.107.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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