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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64855 — soapbar: verify_envelope_bsp accepts an unauthenticated embedded certificate (signature forgery / authentication bypass)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-64855</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; hitoshyamamoto soapbar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;soapbar is a SOAP library for Python — client, server, and WSDL handling. Prior to version 0.13.0, verify_envelope_bsp() derived its trust anchor from the message it was verifying. It read the X.509 certificate out of the caller-untrusted wsse:BinarySecurityToken, validated only that certificate&amp;#39;s not-before / not-after dates, and then verified the signature against that same certificate. There was no CA-chain validation, no issuer/subject allowlist, and no pinning. A successful verify_envelope_bsp() therefore proved only that the envelope was signed by whoever supplied the embedded certificate — never that it was signed by a trusted party. An attacker who mints their own certificate, signs a forged envelope, and embeds that certificate in the token passes verification. Any consumer that treats a successful BSP verification as authentication can be impersonated (signature forgery / authentication bypass). verify_envelope() (which pins a caller-supplied x509_cert) was not affected — the flaw was specific to the BSP variant whose trust anchor came from the message. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; hitoshyamamoto soapbar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;soapbar is a SOAP library for Python — client, server, and WSDL handling. Prior to version 0.13.0, verify_envelope_bsp() derived its trust anchor from the message it was verifying. It read the X.509 certificate out of the caller-untrusted wsse:BinarySecurityToken, validated only that certificate&amp;#39;s not-before / not-after dates, and then verified the signature against that same certificate. There was no CA-chain validation, no issuer/subject allowlist, and no pinning. A successful verify_envelope_bsp() therefore proved only that the envelope was signed by whoever supplied the embedded certificate — never that it was signed by a trusted party. An attacker who mints their own certificate, signs a forged envelope, and embeds that certificate in the token passes verification. Any consumer that treats a successful BSP verification as authentication can be impersonated (signature forgery / authentication bypass). verify_envelope() (which pins a caller-supplied x509_cert) was not affected — the flaw was specific to the BSP variant whose trust anchor came from the message. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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