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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-48716 — nanobot: Path traversal via unsanitized WhatsApp document fileName enables arbitrary file write</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-48716</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; HKUDS nanobot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender&amp;#39;s message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; HKUDS nanobot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender&amp;#39;s message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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