https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 18 Oct 2026 10:30:50 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-26329 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openclaw</p> <p>OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool&#39;s `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright&#39;s `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw&#39;s temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openclaw</p> <p>OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool&#39;s `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright&#39;s `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw&#39;s temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-26329