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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 01:06:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-119192 — Forge: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature forgery via non-canonical DigestInfo encoding</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-119192</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; digitalbazaar forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forge, also called node-forge, is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, publicKey.verify() with the default RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 scheme in lib/rsa.js parses the recovered DigestInfo with the lenient BER parser asn1.fromDer() and validates its structure with digestInfoValidator without requiring canonical DER bytes. Non-minimal or indefinite lengths, malformed parameter values, and non-canonical object identifier encodings with padded subidentifiers or trailing bytes can leave attacker-controlled data inside an accepted DigestInfo. When the verifying RSA public key uses a low exponent such as e=3, an attacker can use that encoding slack to forge a signature without the private key. The same path is used by X.509 certificate and PKCS#7 signature verification. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; digitalbazaar forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forge, also called node-forge, is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, publicKey.verify() with the default RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 scheme in lib/rsa.js parses the recovered DigestInfo with the lenient BER parser asn1.fromDer() and validates its structure with digestInfoValidator without requiring canonical DER bytes. Non-minimal or indefinite lengths, malformed parameter values, and non-canonical object identifier encodings with padded subidentifiers or trailing bytes can leave attacker-controlled data inside an accepted DigestInfo. When the verifying RSA public key uses a low exponent such as e=3, an attacker can use that encoding slack to forge a signature without the private key. The same path is used by X.509 certificate and PKCS#7 signature verification. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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