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      <title>CVE-2018-11518</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2018-11518</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller&amp;#39;s physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller&amp;#39;s earpiece).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller&amp;#39;s physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller&amp;#39;s earpiece).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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