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      <title>CVE-2016-6564 — Ragentek Android software contains an over-the-air update mechanism that communicates over an unencrypted channel, whic…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2016-6564</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ragentek Android software&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Android devices with code from Ragentek contain a privileged binary that performs over-the-air (OTA) update checks. Additionally, there are multiple techniques used to hide the execution of this binary. This behavior could be described as a rootkit. This binary, which resides as /system/bin/debugs, runs with root privileges and does not communicate over an encrypted channel. The binary has been shown to communicate with three hosts via HTTP: oyag[.]lhzbdvm[.]com oyag[.]prugskh[.]net oyag[.]prugskh[.]com Server responses to requests sent by the debugs binary include functionalities to execute arbitrary commands as root, install applications, or update configurations. Examples of a request sent by the client binary: POST /pagt/agent?data={&amp;#34;name&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;c_regist&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;details&amp;#34;:{...}} HTTP/1. 1 Host: 114.80.68.223 Connection: Close An example response from the server could be: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {&amp;#34;code&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;01&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;name&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;push_commands&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;details&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;server_id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;1&amp;#34; , &amp;#34;title&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Test Command&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;comments&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Test&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;commands&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;touch /tmp/test&amp;#34;}} This binary is reported to be present in the following devices: BLU Studio G BLU Studio G Plus BLU Studio 6.0 HD BLU Studio X BLU Studio X Plus BLU Studio C HD Infinix Hot X507 Infinix Hot 2 X510 Infinix Zero X506 Infinix Zero 2 X509 DOOGEE Voyager 2 DG310 LEAGOO Lead 5 LEAGOO Lead 6 LEAGOO Lead 3i LEAGOO Lead 2S LEAGOO Alfa 6 IKU Colorful K45i Beeline Pro 2 XOLO Cube 5.0&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ragentek Android software&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Android devices with code from Ragentek contain a privileged binary that performs over-the-air (OTA) update checks. Additionally, there are multiple techniques used to hide the execution of this binary. This behavior could be described as a rootkit. This binary, which resides as /system/bin/debugs, runs with root privileges and does not communicate over an encrypted channel. The binary has been shown to communicate with three hosts via HTTP: oyag[.]lhzbdvm[.]com oyag[.]prugskh[.]net oyag[.]prugskh[.]com Server responses to requests sent by the debugs binary include functionalities to execute arbitrary commands as root, install applications, or update configurations. Examples of a request sent by the client binary: POST /pagt/agent?data={&amp;#34;name&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;c_regist&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;details&amp;#34;:{...}} HTTP/1. 1 Host: 114.80.68.223 Connection: Close An example response from the server could be: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {&amp;#34;code&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;01&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;name&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;push_commands&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;details&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;server_id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;1&amp;#34; , &amp;#34;title&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Test Command&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;comments&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Test&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;commands&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;touch /tmp/test&amp;#34;}} This binary is reported to be present in the following devices: BLU Studio G BLU Studio G Plus BLU Studio 6.0 HD BLU Studio X BLU Studio X Plus BLU Studio C HD Infinix Hot X507 Infinix Hot 2 X510 Infinix Zero X506 Infinix Zero 2 X509 DOOGEE Voyager 2 DG310 LEAGOO Lead 5 LEAGOO Lead 6 LEAGOO Lead 3i LEAGOO Lead 2S LEAGOO Alfa 6 IKU Colorful K45i Beeline Pro 2 XOLO Cube 5.0&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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