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      <title>CVE-2026-67444 — Hubleys: Stored XSS via unrestricted background-image upload, served with an attacker-chosen Content-Type and no CSP pr…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-67444</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; knrdl hubleys-dashboard&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hubleys is a dashboard for self-hosted services. Prior to version 0.5.2, any authenticated (non-admin) Hubleys user can upload a file with an arbitrary extension as their dashboard &amp;#34;background image,&amp;#34; and the server will later serve that file back with a Content-Type derived straight from the attacker&amp;#39;s chosen extension - so uploading an .html file gets it served as text/html. Because the endpoint that serves it returns a manually-constructed response rather than going through SvelteKit&amp;#39;s normal page-rendering pipeline, the app&amp;#39;s configured Content-Security-Policy never gets attached to it either, so a script embedded in the upload runs unrestricted. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; knrdl hubleys-dashboard&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hubleys is a dashboard for self-hosted services. Prior to version 0.5.2, any authenticated (non-admin) Hubleys user can upload a file with an arbitrary extension as their dashboard &amp;#34;background image,&amp;#34; and the server will later serve that file back with a Content-Type derived straight from the attacker&amp;#39;s chosen extension - so uploading an .html file gets it served as text/html. Because the endpoint that serves it returns a manually-constructed response rather than going through SvelteKit&amp;#39;s normal page-rendering pipeline, the app&amp;#39;s configured Content-Security-Policy never gets attached to it either, so a script embedded in the upload runs unrestricted. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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