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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 01:52:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-124278 — Path bindings ignored for gRPC Content-Types on transcoded routes in elixir-grpc grpc_server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-124278</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; elixir-grpc grpc_server, elixir-grpc grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server and grpc allows an attacker to make a handler act on a resource other than the one named in the URL of an HTTP-transcoded route, via a request with a gRPC Content-Type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the transcoding clause of GRPC.Server.do_handle_request/4 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server.ex, and lib/grpc/server.ex before the package split) applies the route&amp;#39;s path bindings to the request message. The Cowboy handler picks that clause from the request Content-Type, not from the route. A request to a transcoded URL with application/grpc or application/grpc-web is decoded from the body alone, so every path-bound field takes its value from the body. A gateway, proxy rule or WAF that authorizes on the URL path sees one resource while the handler receives another.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0; grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; elixir-grpc grpc_server, elixir-grpc grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server and grpc allows an attacker to make a handler act on a resource other than the one named in the URL of an HTTP-transcoded route, via a request with a gRPC Content-Type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the transcoding clause of GRPC.Server.do_handle_request/4 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server.ex, and lib/grpc/server.ex before the package split) applies the route&amp;#39;s path bindings to the request message. The Cowboy handler picks that clause from the request Content-Type, not from the route. A request to a transcoded URL with application/grpc or application/grpc-web is decoded from the body alone, so every path-bound field takes its value from the body. A gateway, proxy rule or WAF that authorizes on the URL path sees one resource while the handler receives another.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0; grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-124278</guid>
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