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      <title>CVE-2026-126344 — @hono/node-server: WebSocket upgrade request-target starting with `//` replaces the host in `c.req.url`, bypassing `Ori…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-126344</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; honojs node-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@hono/node-server allows running the Hono application on Node.js. From 2.0.0 until 2.1.6, the WebSocket upgrade path resolves a raw request-target beginning with // against a base URL built from the Host header, causing the WHATWG URL parser to treat the request-target as a network-path reference and replace the host in c.req.url. Routing still uses the local WebSocket path, so an application that compares the Origin header with the origin of c.req.url, including checks implemented with csrf(), compares an attacker&amp;#39;s origin with itself and accepts the connection. A page on another site can consequently open a WebSocket with the victim&amp;#39;s cookies and read and send messages when the application uses upgradeWebSocket and trusts the host in c.req.url. Ordinary HTTP requests are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; honojs node-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@hono/node-server allows running the Hono application on Node.js. From 2.0.0 until 2.1.6, the WebSocket upgrade path resolves a raw request-target beginning with // against a base URL built from the Host header, causing the WHATWG URL parser to treat the request-target as a network-path reference and replace the host in c.req.url. Routing still uses the local WebSocket path, so an application that compares the Origin header with the origin of c.req.url, including checks implemented with csrf(), compares an attacker&amp;#39;s origin with itself and accepts the connection. A page on another site can consequently open a WebSocket with the victim&amp;#39;s cookies and read and send messages when the application uses upgradeWebSocket and trusts the host in c.req.url. Ordinary HTTP requests are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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