<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 04:22:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-126957 — ICMPv4 Record Route / Timestamp option: stack OOB read via ptr underflow in icmpv4.c</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-126957</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; zephyrproject-rtos Zephyr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An integer underflow in Zephyr&amp;#39;s IPv4 option handling allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to read stack memory. When replying to an ICMP Echo Request that carries an IPv4 Record Route or Timestamp option, icmpv4_update_record_route() and icmpv4_update_time_stamp() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c compute the length of the already recorded data as ptr - ptr_offset in uint8_t arithmetic. The attacker-controlled Pointer field is checked against the option length but not against the RFC 791 minimum (4 for Record Route, 5 for Timestamp), so a smaller value wraps the length to up to 252 bytes. net_pkt_write() then reads past the 40-byte opt_data stack buffer and up to 213 bytes of stack memory, which can include stack and heap pointers, are returned in the ICMP Echo Reply. A single packet triggers the leak and the device does not crash, so it can be repeated. Devices built with CONFIG_NET_IPV4_HDR_OPTIONS, which CONFIG_NET_IPV4_IGMP selects, are affected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; zephyrproject-rtos Zephyr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An integer underflow in Zephyr&amp;#39;s IPv4 option handling allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to read stack memory. When replying to an ICMP Echo Request that carries an IPv4 Record Route or Timestamp option, icmpv4_update_record_route() and icmpv4_update_time_stamp() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c compute the length of the already recorded data as ptr - ptr_offset in uint8_t arithmetic. The attacker-controlled Pointer field is checked against the option length but not against the RFC 791 minimum (4 for Record Route, 5 for Timestamp), so a smaller value wraps the length to up to 252 bytes. net_pkt_write() then reads past the 40-byte opt_data stack buffer and up to 213 bytes of stack memory, which can include stack and heap pointers, are returned in the ICMP Echo Reply. A single packet triggers the leak and the device does not crash, so it can be repeated. Devices built with CONFIG_NET_IPV4_HDR_OPTIONS, which CONFIG_NET_IPV4_IGMP selects, are affected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-126957</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
