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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 03:38:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-67546 — Heym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-67546</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; heymrun heym&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; heymrun heym&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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