<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 10:41:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-107826 — OWASP Coraza WAF: JSON body processor: argument-limit truncation reopens an unbounded-depth gjson.Valid stack overflow…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-107826</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; corazawaf coraza&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.1, readJSON in internal/bodyprocessors/json.go can stop its bounded flattening walk after reaching SecArgumentsLimit or the byte budget and then call gjson.Valid on the complete raw body. An unauthenticated attacker can submit shallow values followed by an extremely deeply nested JSON tail that was not visited by the bounded walk, causing gjson.Valid to recurse without a depth bound and terminate the hosting process with an unrecoverable fatal stack overflow. The ProcessRequest and ProcessResponse JSON paths share the affected readJSON validation flow, and the payload can remain within recommended body-size and argument-count limits. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; corazawaf coraza&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.1, readJSON in internal/bodyprocessors/json.go can stop its bounded flattening walk after reaching SecArgumentsLimit or the byte budget and then call gjson.Valid on the complete raw body. An unauthenticated attacker can submit shallow values followed by an extremely deeply nested JSON tail that was not visited by the bounded walk, causing gjson.Valid to recurse without a depth bound and terminate the hosting process with an unrecoverable fatal stack overflow. The ProcessRequest and ProcessResponse JSON paths share the affected readJSON validation flow, and the payload can remain within recommended body-size and argument-count limits. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-107826</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
