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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-107825 — OWASP Coraza WAF: ProcessURI silently drops QUERY_STRING and ARGS_GET on URI parse failure — defense-in-depth bypass fo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-107825</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; corazawaf coraza&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.0, ProcessURI in internal/corazawaf/transaction.go handles a url.ParseRequestURI failure by retaining the raw URI but leaving QUERY_STRING, ARGS_GET, ARGS_GET_NAMES, and the GET-derived portion of ARGS empty. An unauthenticated attacker can place control bytes in a URI passed directly by integrations such as coraza-spoa, coraza-proxy-wasm, custom FFI hosts, or WASM hosts, causing Coraza to omit query parameters that the downstream integration may still process and allowing rules targeting those variables to be bypassed. The bundled coraza/v3/http integration is not affected because Go net/http rejects such malformed request targets before calling Coraza. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; corazawaf coraza&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.0, ProcessURI in internal/corazawaf/transaction.go handles a url.ParseRequestURI failure by retaining the raw URI but leaving QUERY_STRING, ARGS_GET, ARGS_GET_NAMES, and the GET-derived portion of ARGS empty. An unauthenticated attacker can place control bytes in a URI passed directly by integrations such as coraza-spoa, coraza-proxy-wasm, custom FFI hosts, or WASM hosts, causing Coraza to omit query parameters that the downstream integration may still process and allowing rules targeting those variables to be bypassed. The bundled coraza/v3/http integration is not affected because Go net/http rejects such malformed request targets before calling Coraza. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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