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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-11430 — Grav CMS Scheduler Webhook Authentication Bypass via Null Short-Circuit</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-11430</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Trilby Media grav-plugin-scheduler-webhook, Trilby Media getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Grav CMS&amp;#39;s scheduler-webhook plugin contains an authentication bypass in the webhook token check. When the webhook feature is enabled but no webhookToken is configured, a compound conditional short-circuits and skips token validation, so an unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach POST /scheduler/webhook can trigger the operator&amp;#39;s already-configured scheduled jobs by sending a single request. The primitive is triggering-existing-jobs, not attacker-chosen command execution: the attacker controls when the jobs run and which one runs (via ?job=), but does not control what the jobs do. Code execution follows only when the operator has configured a job that shells out, and even then the attacker controls timing rather than payload. Not a default-install issue: reaching the endpoint requires the separate scheduler-webhook GPM plugin to be installed, scheduler.modern.webhook.enabled to be true (default false), and no webhookToken to be configured; a stock Grav or Grav-Admin install exposes nothing here.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Trilby Media grav-plugin-scheduler-webhook, Trilby Media getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Grav CMS&amp;#39;s scheduler-webhook plugin contains an authentication bypass in the webhook token check. When the webhook feature is enabled but no webhookToken is configured, a compound conditional short-circuits and skips token validation, so an unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach POST /scheduler/webhook can trigger the operator&amp;#39;s already-configured scheduled jobs by sending a single request. The primitive is triggering-existing-jobs, not attacker-chosen command execution: the attacker controls when the jobs run and which one runs (via ?job=), but does not control what the jobs do. Code execution follows only when the operator has configured a job that shells out, and even then the attacker controls timing rather than payload. Not a default-install issue: reaching the endpoint requires the separate scheduler-webhook GPM plugin to be installed, scheduler.modern.webhook.enabled to be true (default false), and no webhookToken to be configured; a stock Grav or Grav-Admin install exposes nothing here.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-11430</guid>
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