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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:33:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-58504 — draw.io: Stored XSS on file open via editable=0 sibling cell — patch bypass of CVE-2026-46642</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58504</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jgraph drawio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.5, opening or importing a crafted .drawio file can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the draw.io origin when selected cells are processed by TextFormatPanel.addFont() in src/main/webapp/js/grapheditor/Format.js. An HTML sibling cell keeps the formatted-label path enabled while an editable=0 plain-text sibling is excluded from the merged selection style but remains in the iteration set. graph.cellRenderer.getLabelValue() returns that plain-text label without HTML encoding, and mxUtils.canConvertHtmlToSvg() parses it as HTML, bypassing the earlier CVE-2026-46642 remediation. Successful exploitation can expose diagram data, browser storage, non-HttpOnly cookies, and same-origin actions available to the victim. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jgraph drawio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.5, opening or importing a crafted .drawio file can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the draw.io origin when selected cells are processed by TextFormatPanel.addFont() in src/main/webapp/js/grapheditor/Format.js. An HTML sibling cell keeps the formatted-label path enabled while an editable=0 plain-text sibling is excluded from the merged selection style but remains in the iteration set. graph.cellRenderer.getLabelValue() returns that plain-text label without HTML encoding, and mxUtils.canConvertHtmlToSvg() parses it as HTML, bypassing the earlier CVE-2026-46642 remediation. Successful exploitation can expose diagram data, browser storage, non-HttpOnly cookies, and same-origin actions available to the victim. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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