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      <title>CVE-2026-63334 — draw.io: SSRF via DNS rebinding in ProxyServlet bypasses private IP blocklist</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-63334</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jgraph drawio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, deployments with ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery because src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java performs the private-address check in Utils.sanitizeUrl() using one DNS resolution, while src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/ProxyServlet.java later calls URL.openConnection() and performs a second resolution. An attacker-controlled hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and then to a private, link-local, or cloud metadata address when the connection is opened. Successful exploitation can return cloud instance metadata or responses from internal HTTP services through the proxy. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jgraph drawio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, deployments with ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery because src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java performs the private-address check in Utils.sanitizeUrl() using one DNS resolution, while src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/ProxyServlet.java later calls URL.openConnection() and performs a second resolution. An attacker-controlled hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and then to a private, link-local, or cloud metadata address when the connection is opened. Successful exploitation can return cloud instance metadata or responses from internal HTTP services through the proxy. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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