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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 16:09:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-90044 — usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-90044</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ffs_epfile_write_iter() and ffs_epfile_read_iter(), when ffs_epfile_io()
fails with an error other than -EIOCBQUEUED, the io_data structure (`p`) is
freed. However, for AIO operations, the kiocb cancel function was already
armed and kiocb-&amp;gt;private was set to `p`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a concurrent cancel operation (such as sys_io_cancel()) executes after
ffs_epfile_io() fails but before the function frees `p`, a Use-After-Free
can occur when the cancellation handler accesses the freed pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To securely fix this race condition, we must properly un-arm the
cancellation. Invoking `kiocb-&amp;gt;ki_complete()` does exactly this by
acquiring `ctx-&amp;gt;ctx_lock` and safely removing the kiocb from the active
sequence. In doing so, it ensures that a parallel io_cancel can no longer
discover the kiocb, effectively closing the race window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We then return -EIOCBQUEUED to notify the VFS layer that the kiocb has been
consumed and it should avoid attempting to complete the request again or
triggering subsequent completion handlers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ffs_epfile_write_iter() and ffs_epfile_read_iter(), when ffs_epfile_io()
fails with an error other than -EIOCBQUEUED, the io_data structure (`p`) is
freed. However, for AIO operations, the kiocb cancel function was already
armed and kiocb-&amp;gt;private was set to `p`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a concurrent cancel operation (such as sys_io_cancel()) executes after
ffs_epfile_io() fails but before the function frees `p`, a Use-After-Free
can occur when the cancellation handler accesses the freed pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To securely fix this race condition, we must properly un-arm the
cancellation. Invoking `kiocb-&amp;gt;ki_complete()` does exactly this by
acquiring `ctx-&amp;gt;ctx_lock` and safely removing the kiocb from the active
sequence. In doing so, it ensures that a parallel io_cancel can no longer
discover the kiocb, effectively closing the race window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We then return -EIOCBQUEUED to notify the VFS layer that the kiocb has been
consumed and it should avoid attempting to complete the request again or
triggering subsequent completion handlers.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-90044</guid>
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