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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:49:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-86739 — Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 Acceptance Finalization Without Stored Evidence</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-86739</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; grokability snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance-&amp;gt;accept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the &amp;#39;accepted&amp;#39; action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; grokability snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance-&amp;gt;accept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the &amp;#39;accepted&amp;#39; action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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