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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-86760 — snipe-it 8.2.0 before 8.7.0 Authentication Bypass via activated flag</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-86760</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; grokability snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target&amp;#39;s company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; grokability snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target&amp;#39;s company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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