https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 11:45:31 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89674 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>nfsd: fix XDR length calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget</p> <p>The XDR buffer size calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() has multiple errors that can result in either an out-of-bounds write or leaking uninitialized kernel memory to the client:</p> <p>- fh_len doesn&#39;t account for XDR padding on the file handle data - uid and gid lengths use &#34;8 + len&#34; but xdr_encode_opaque() actually writes &#34;4 + xdr_align_size(len)&#34; bytes - ds_len omits the flags and stats_collect_hint fields (8 bytes), while len&#39;s header constant overestimates by 8 bytes -- these partially cancel but leave a net mismatch</p> <p>The worst case occurs with short strings (e.g. uid=0, gid=0 with an odd-sized file handle), where the function writes up to 5 bytes past the reserved XDR buffer. Conversely, when string lengths happen to be 4-byte aligned, the reservation is too large and stale buffer content is sent to the client.</p> <p>Fix this by breaking out every encoded field explicitly in the ds_len calculation, using xdr_align_size() for all variable-length opaque fields, and correcting the header constants.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>nfsd: fix XDR length calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget</p> <p>The XDR buffer size calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() has multiple errors that can result in either an out-of-bounds write or leaking uninitialized kernel memory to the client:</p> <p>- fh_len doesn&#39;t account for XDR padding on the file handle data - uid and gid lengths use &#34;8 + len&#34; but xdr_encode_opaque() actually writes &#34;4 + xdr_align_size(len)&#34; bytes - ds_len omits the flags and stats_collect_hint fields (8 bytes), while len&#39;s header constant overestimates by 8 bytes -- these partially cancel but leave a net mismatch</p> <p>The worst case occurs with short strings (e.g. uid=0, gid=0 with an odd-sized file handle), where the function writes up to 5 bytes past the reserved XDR buffer. Conversely, when string lengths happen to be 4-byte aligned, the reservation is too large and stale buffer content is sent to the client.</p> <p>Fix this by breaking out every encoded field explicitly in the ds_len calculation, using xdr_align_size() for all variable-length opaque fields, and correcting the header constants.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89674