https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 11:39:49 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89650 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3</p> <p>ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p &gt; info_end) is gated on info_v &gt;= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory.</p> <p>A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info-&gt;export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker.</p> <p>Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3</p> <p>ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p &gt; info_end) is gated on info_v &gt;= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory.</p> <p>A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info-&gt;export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker.</p> <p>Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89650