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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 02:34:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89634 — smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89634</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&amp;#34;smb/client: fix possible
infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&amp;#34;) compared the post-ALIGN
length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow:
for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8)
wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop
advances by zero bytes leaving &amp;#39;p&amp;#39; pointing into stale data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space
before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after.  Since raw_len is
bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check
is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&amp;#34;smb/client: fix possible
infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&amp;#34;) compared the post-ALIGN
length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow:
for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8)
wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop
advances by zero bytes leaving &amp;#39;p&amp;#39; pointing into stale data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space
before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after.  Since raw_len is
bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check
is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89634</guid>
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