<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 13:44:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89743 — misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89743</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported
by the NSM device into msg-&amp;gt;resp.len without bounding it to the response
buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the
response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the
fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an
out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in
fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved
devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic
is unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported
by the NSM device into msg-&amp;gt;resp.len without bounding it to the response
buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the
response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the
fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an
out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in
fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved
devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic
is unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-89743</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
