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      <title>CVE-2026-52767 — YesWiki: Unauthenticated ActivityPub Signature-Verification Bypass via `!openssl_verify(...)` accepting `int(-1)`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52767</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; yeswiki&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;YesWiki is a wiki system written in PHP. From version 4.6.2 to before version 4.6.6, HttpSignatureService::verifySignature() checks the result of PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify() with a loose boolean negation - if (!openssl_verify(...)) { throw ... }. PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify has four possible return values: 1, 0, -1, and &amp;#34;false&amp;#34;. The -1 row is the bypass: PHP&amp;#39;s truthiness rules make -1 a truthy value, so !(-1) === false, the throw is skipped, and the controller proceeds to processActivity(). Any condition that makes OpenSSL&amp;#39;s EVP_VerifyFinal() return -1 triggers the bypass. The reachable consequence is the controller silently treats a failed verification as success and processes the attacker&amp;#39;s payload. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; yeswiki&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;YesWiki is a wiki system written in PHP. From version 4.6.2 to before version 4.6.6, HttpSignatureService::verifySignature() checks the result of PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify() with a loose boolean negation - if (!openssl_verify(...)) { throw ... }. PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify has four possible return values: 1, 0, -1, and &amp;#34;false&amp;#34;. The -1 row is the bypass: PHP&amp;#39;s truthiness rules make -1 a truthy value, so !(-1) === false, the throw is skipped, and the controller proceeds to processActivity(). Any condition that makes OpenSSL&amp;#39;s EVP_VerifyFinal() return -1 triggers the bypass. The reachable consequence is the controller silently treats a failed verification as success and processes the attacker&amp;#39;s payload. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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