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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-86351 — MISP User Homepage Validation Allows Authenticated Open Redirect via Protocol-Relative URL</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-86351</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of MISP validate the user-configurable homepage by checking only whether the supplied path begins with /. That check is insufficient because protocol-relative URLs such as //attacker.example also begin with / but resolve to an external origin in browsers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable homepage value can be stored as a user setting and later used by the post-login routing logic. The commit explicitly identifies //attacker.example as a payload that passed validation and was emitted to the Location header after login.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix introduces a shared InternalRedirectValidator that rejects URLs containing a host, scheme, userinfo, unsafe leading // or /\, malformed URLs, and control characters. It also revalidates homepage settings on read so legacy or internally written unsafe values cannot bypass the new storage-time validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: ≤2.5.45&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of MISP validate the user-configurable homepage by checking only whether the supplied path begins with /. That check is insufficient because protocol-relative URLs such as //attacker.example also begin with / but resolve to an external origin in browsers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable homepage value can be stored as a user setting and later used by the post-login routing logic. The commit explicitly identifies //attacker.example as a payload that passed validation and was emitted to the Location header after login.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix introduces a shared InternalRedirectValidator that rejects URLs containing a host, scheme, userinfo, unsafe leading // or /\, malformed URLs, and control characters. It also revalidates homepage settings on read so legacy or internally written unsafe values cannot bypass the new storage-time validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version affected: ≤2.5.45&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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