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      <title>CVE-2026-79745 — MCPHub: Missing Authorization on Built-in Prompt &amp; Resource CRUD (Unauthorized Tampering of Globally-Served Templates/R…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-79745</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; samanhappy mcphub&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MCPHub is a unified hub for centrally managing and dynamically orchestrating multiple MCP servers/APIs into separate endpoints with flexible routing strategies. Prior to version 1.0.32, the built-in prompt and resource controllers perform no role checking. The mutating POST/PUT /api/prompts* and POST/PUT /api/resources* routes are attached to the authenticated router with no admin gate, and the handlers never read req.user. The DAO singletons they write are consulted first — ahead of any connected MCP server — for every session in handleGetPromptRequest / handleReadResourceRequest. A non-admin can therefore create, overwrite, and shadow global prompt templates and resources that all other users are served. The scored impact is the unauthorized integrity violation (creation/tampering/shadowing of globally-served records); stored prompt injection into other users&amp;#39; LLM sessions is a downstream consequence of that tampering. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.32.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; samanhappy mcphub&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MCPHub is a unified hub for centrally managing and dynamically orchestrating multiple MCP servers/APIs into separate endpoints with flexible routing strategies. Prior to version 1.0.32, the built-in prompt and resource controllers perform no role checking. The mutating POST/PUT /api/prompts* and POST/PUT /api/resources* routes are attached to the authenticated router with no admin gate, and the handlers never read req.user. The DAO singletons they write are consulted first — ahead of any connected MCP server — for every session in handleGetPromptRequest / handleReadResourceRequest. A non-admin can therefore create, overwrite, and shadow global prompt templates and resources that all other users are served. The scored impact is the unauthorized integrity violation (creation/tampering/shadowing of globally-served records); stored prompt injection into other users&amp;#39; LLM sessions is a downstream consequence of that tampering. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.32.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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