<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:49:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-81315 — MCP DNS-rebinding origin check in AshAi is bypassed by a spoofed X-Forwarded-Proto header</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-81315</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server&amp;#39;s DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user&amp;#39;s local MCP server with that user&amp;#39;s actor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker&amp;#39;s origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server&amp;#39;s DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user&amp;#39;s local MCP server with that user&amp;#39;s actor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker&amp;#39;s origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-81315</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
