<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 05:06:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64194 — Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-64194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLNETLABS Net::DNS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLNETLABS Net::DNS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-64194</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
