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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:54:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-72889 — Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-72889</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Net-OAuth&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Net-OAuth&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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