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      <title>CVE-2026-62676 — Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-62676</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; omnigent-ai omnigent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, the timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a single background control operator. A gated git push or gh write hidden with these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the github.py write_repos and write_branches allowlist and the working_dir.py workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can therefore push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; omnigent-ai omnigent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, the timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a single background control operator. A gated git push or gh write hidden with these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the github.py write_repos and write_branches allowlist and the working_dir.py workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can therefore push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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