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      <title>CVE-2026-55557 — browse-mcp: Arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state paths</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55557</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; That1Drifter browse-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;browse-mcp is a Playwright-based headless-browser MCP server for MCP-capable agents. Prior to 0.8.2, browser_download writes a fetched response body to join(save_dir, filename) without validating the caller-controlled save_dir, while browser_save_state and browser_load_state honor a caller-controlled path unchanged. A malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page, can choose an arbitrary save_dir or state path and a URL whose response body becomes attacker-controlled file contents, allowing writes to any path the process can reach, including ~/.bashrc, autostart entries, or cron files, and potentially leading to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback also uses a raw fetch() that bypasses the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; That1Drifter browse-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;browse-mcp is a Playwright-based headless-browser MCP server for MCP-capable agents. Prior to 0.8.2, browser_download writes a fetched response body to join(save_dir, filename) without validating the caller-controlled save_dir, while browser_save_state and browser_load_state honor a caller-controlled path unchanged. A malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page, can choose an arbitrary save_dir or state path and a URL whose response body becomes attacker-controlled file contents, allowing writes to any path the process can reach, including ~/.bashrc, autostart entries, or cron files, and potentially leading to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback also uses a raw fetch() that bypasses the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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