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      <title>CVE-2026-63187 — Logto: OS command injection vulnerability exists in the Commitlint workflow</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-63187</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; logto-io logto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. From 1.40.1 until 1.41.0, Logto&amp;#39;s .github/workflows/commitlint.yml directly interpolated github.event.pull_request.title into the Commitlint on PR title step&amp;#39;s inline echo command before piping the title to npx commitlint. A pull request title containing a single quote could terminate the echo string and append arbitrary shell commands on the GitHub Actions runner. The pull_request trigger used a read-only GITHUB_TOKEN and did not expose repository secrets, but injected commands could alter or disrupt the ephemeral workflow execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; logto-io logto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. From 1.40.1 until 1.41.0, Logto&amp;#39;s .github/workflows/commitlint.yml directly interpolated github.event.pull_request.title into the Commitlint on PR title step&amp;#39;s inline echo command before piping the title to npx commitlint. A pull request title containing a single quote could terminate the echo string and append arbitrary shell commands on the GitHub Actions runner. The pull_request trigger used a read-only GITHUB_TOKEN and did not expose repository secrets, but injected commands could alter or disrupt the ephemeral workflow execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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