<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 01:07:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-47735 — Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47735</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Basekick-Labs arc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc&amp;#39;s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Basekick-Labs arc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc&amp;#39;s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47735</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
