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      <title>CVE-2026-48105 — Arc Enterprise cluster FSM applyRegisterFile accepts arbitrary file paths without validation, enabling cluster-wide pat…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-48105</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Basekick-Labs arc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc Enterprise&amp;#39;s Raft FSM (`internal/cluster/raft/fsm.go:applyRegisterFile`) accepts attacker-chosen file paths in manifest-registration proposals without validating them against the configured storage backend. The only check is that the path is non-empty. There is no parent-traversal (`..`) rejection, no allowlist of legitimate prefixes, no scheme restriction (`s3://` vs local), and no length bound. This is fixed in 2026.06.1. Some workarounds are available. Restrict cluster network access to known-trusted peers via strict firewall rules, audit the cluster manifest for unexpected paths (any path not matching the configured storage backend root is suspect), and/or disable cluster mode until the fix is available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Basekick-Labs arc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc Enterprise&amp;#39;s Raft FSM (`internal/cluster/raft/fsm.go:applyRegisterFile`) accepts attacker-chosen file paths in manifest-registration proposals without validating them against the configured storage backend. The only check is that the path is non-empty. There is no parent-traversal (`..`) rejection, no allowlist of legitimate prefixes, no scheme restriction (`s3://` vs local), and no length bound. This is fixed in 2026.06.1. Some workarounds are available. Restrict cluster network access to known-trusted peers via strict firewall rules, audit the cluster manifest for unexpected paths (any path not matching the configured storage backend root is suspect), and/or disable cluster mode until the fix is available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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