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      <title>CVE-2026-77812 — Cleartext Exposure of DJI Drone Wi-Fi Credentials via BLE</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-77812</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; DJI Neo, DJI Neo 2, DJI Flip, DJI Air 3, DJI Air 3S, DJI Avata 2, DJI Avata 360, DJI Mavic 3, DJI Mavic 3 Classic, DJI Mavic 3 Pro and 6 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone&amp;#39;s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone&amp;#39;s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone&amp;#39;s network 
* The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices.
* The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely
* The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed
* A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected models are…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; DJI Neo, DJI Neo 2, DJI Flip, DJI Air 3, DJI Air 3S, DJI Avata 2, DJI Avata 360, DJI Mavic 3, DJI Mavic 3 Classic, DJI Mavic 3 Pro and 6 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone&amp;#39;s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone&amp;#39;s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone&amp;#39;s network 
* The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices.
* The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely
* The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed
* A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected models are…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-77812</guid>
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