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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>CVE-2026-62677 — Omnigent: Unvalidated os_env.cwd in agent bundle yields arbitrary host filesystem access on runners without OMNIGENT_RU…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-62677</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; omnigent-ai omnigent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, an authenticated user can upload a session-scoped agent bundle with an absolute or traversal-containing os_env.cwd value because omnigent/spec/parser.py stores the value verbatim and omnigent/spec/validator.py does not constrain it. On a runner where OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE is unset, omnigent/runner/resource_registry.py preserves the attacker-controlled path and omnigent/inner/os_env.py uses the resolved path as the environment root and copytree source. The _assert_within_cwd check then treats that attacker-selected root as trusted, allowing sys_os_read, write, edit, and shell tools to access runner files and environment secrets outside the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; omnigent-ai omnigent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, an authenticated user can upload a session-scoped agent bundle with an absolute or traversal-containing os_env.cwd value because omnigent/spec/parser.py stores the value verbatim and omnigent/spec/validator.py does not constrain it. On a runner where OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE is unset, omnigent/runner/resource_registry.py preserves the attacker-controlled path and omnigent/inner/os_env.py uses the resolved path as the environment root and copytree source. The _assert_within_cwd check then treats that attacker-selected root as trusted, allowing sys_os_read, write, edit, and shell tools to access runner files and environment secrets outside the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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